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Foreign private investment helps drive development. And the formation of markets
that allocate such investment efficiently and effectively cannot help but improve the econ-
omies and living standards of people in developing countries) Indeed, even the most
cursory study of the economies of Asia and South America illustrates the power of securi-
ties markets in greasing the wheels of export production, privatization, and infrastructure
development. 2 Convinced-for better or worse 3-of their desirability and effectiveness, the
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1. E.g., African Development Bank Group, Making Finance Work for Africa Partnership, http://
www.afdb.org/en/topics-sectors/initiatives-parmerships/making-finance-work-for-africa-partnership/ [here-
inafter AJDB Making Finance Work]. For a discussion of the role of capital markets in developing economies,
see generally Rj. BRusToN, THE STOCK EXCHANGE AND INVESTMENT ANALysIs (London: George Allen and
Unwin Ltd., 1973); N.F. STAPLEY, THE STOCK MARKET: A GUIDE FOR THE PRIVATE INVESTORS (Cam-
bridge: Woodhead-Faulker, 1986); Robert Hockett, From Macro to Micro to "Mission-Creep": Defending the
IMF's Emerging Concern with the Infrastructural Prerequisites to Global Financial Stability, 41 COLUM. J. TRANS-
NAT'L L. 153 (2002); United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Sept. 20-21, 2007, Trade and
Development Implications of Financial Services, TD/B/COM.1/EM.33/3 (Aug. 3, 2007), available at http://
www.unctad.org/en/docs/clem33d3-en.pdf) [hereinafter UNCTAD Trade & Dev.].
2. See, e.g., Kenneth Mwenda, Securities Regulation and Emerging Markets: Legal and Institutional Issues for
Southern and Eastern Africa, 7 MuRDocH UNIv. ELEC. J. OF LAw (2000), available at http://
www.murdoch.edu.au/elaw/issues/v7nl/mwenda7l_.text.html ("the performance of a number of Tiger mar-
kets in the Fair East, prior to the mid-1990 financial crisis, is a notorious fact of how emerging markets have
been able to deliver superior returns"); Mark R. Yzaguirre, Project Finance and Privatization: The Bolivian
Erample, 20 Hous. J. INT'L L. 597 (1998); Jessica T. Mathews, Power Shift, FOREIGN AFFAIRs, Jan./Feb.
1997, at 57 (highlighting the growing impact of private capital flows). For a contrary view, see Paul Krugman,
The Conscience of a Liberal: Finance Mythburting, Third World Edition, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 9, 2009, available at
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world's least developed countries have already begun building their own securities mar-
kets.4 Nevertheless, despite all the best of intentions, the plethora of role models and
sample sets, and the usefulness of available advice and expertise, the capital markets in
these growing economies remain relatively unproductive and small.s
This paper intends to identify and examine the legal issues that obstruct the growth of
securities markets in the least developed economies-Sub Saharan Africa (SSA), in particu-
lar-and to suggest and explain a possible solution: the solicitation of long-term public
pension fund investors from more developed economies. The involvement of these inves-
tors will bring much needed liquidity and capitalization to SSA's markets. They will also
ensure that growth is both sustainable and socially responsible.
To accomplish its purpose, the paper first presents a brief history of the development of
capital markets in SSA. It then outlines the legal obstacles curtailing their further expan-
sion, and next suggests that encouraging the participation of foreign public pension funds
will help increase the liquidity and capitalization of SSA markets while ensuring that re-
sources will flow to long-term, development-friendly projects. Further, the paper sug-
gests that public pension fund investors will exert pressure on SSA governments to adopt
smart and sustainable corporate governance reforms. The paper concludes with a presen-
tation of the kinds of laws and governance reforms that might attract and nurture these
socially responsible, long-term investors.
I. Capital Market Development in Sub-Saharan Africa
In the past few decades, capital markets emerged in many developing economies, in-
cluding those in SSA. Nineteen stock exchanges now litter the African continent-more
than double those in existence twenty years earlier. 6 Indubitably, the general trend to-
wards globalization, i.e., the liberalization of trade barriers, financial regulation, and other
obstacles to the free flow of capital, encouraged their formation. Some specific actors and
events, however, were also instrumental. These are outlined below.
http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.coii/2009/ll/09/finance-mythbusting-third-world-edition/ (noting that
growth of markets in Latin America, Asia, and Eastern Europe ended in grief).
3. The desirability of flourishing capital markets is not universally accepted, and the link between capital
markets and development remains controversial. For example, some argue that stock markets "might not
perform efficiently in developing countries and that it may not be feasible for all African markets to promote
stock markets given the huge costs and the poor financial structures." Charles Ano Yartley & Charles Komla
Adjasi, Stock Market Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: Critical Issues and Challenges, 3 (IMF, Working Paper
WP/07/209, 2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1012992 (citing Ajit
Singh, Should Africa Promote Stock Market Capitalirm?, 1 IJ. IrT'L DEv. 343-365 (1999)). On the other hand,
"[clorporate financing patterns in certain African countries suggest that stock markets are an important
source of finance." Id. at I1. The intent of this paper, however, is not to determine the necessity of such
markets to development. Instead, it aims to understand the legal challenges blocking their growth and to
suggest some solutions.
4. See, e.g., G.C. Nwaobi, Securities Markets and Social Capital Integration in Africa: Risk and Policy Options,
QUANTITATIVE EcONOMIc RESEARCH BUREAU 5 (Dec. 19, 2005).
5. Id. at 23.
6. Yartley & Adjasi, supra note 3, at 3, 6. Stock markets exist in Botswana, Ghana, Egypt, Cameroun,
Code D'Ivoire (a regional exchange for West Africa), Kenya, Namibia, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique,
South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. See Yartley & Adjasi,
supra note 3, at 6; see also Mwenda, supra note 2 (also noting that THE EcoNosusT failed to recognize many
of these markets as "emerging," i.e., growing).
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A. HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF AFRICAN SECURITIES MARKETS
About thirty years ago, the theory of "development economics" emerged in the devel-
opment community as a tool to implement emerging markets' transition from rural, agri-
cultural economies to something more industrialized, modernized, and urbanized.7
Included in this specialization was a certainty regarding the importance of a strong and
transparent financial sector, i.e., a nation's banking system, capital markets, and non-bank-
ing institutional intermediaries like private institutional investors.8 Succinctly, developers'
goal was to stimulate local investment by increasing savings rates and attracting foreign
portfolio investors.9 The assumption then postulated that the greater liquidity and invest-
ment efficiency created would lead to growth in the "real" sector.' 0 Through the 1980s
and 1990s, as in many other developing economies, Africa embraced reforms that at-
tempted to implement these ideas. Among their efforts was the creation of securities
markets.
Meanwhile, the Bretton Woods and other aid institutions encouraged the development
of securities markets by advocating the issuance of government and municipal bonds as
alternative sources of development financing.II Indeed, the South African bond market
now thrives, and those in Nigeria, Egypt, and Kenya continue to develop. But the re-
mainder of African bond markets-to the extent they exist at all-linger in their infancy.12
In addition to emerging sovereign bond markets, the privatization of state-owned enter-
prises also prompted securities market development in SSA.13 Rich in natural resources,'4
7. Anthony M. Vernava, Financial Liberalization in an Emerging Market: Peru's Financial Reforms and the
Lima Stock Exchange- With Focus on Concentration, Emerging Market Institutional Investors and Peruvian Financial
Conglomerates, 6 Sw. J.L. & TRADE AM. 209, 213 (1999); see also United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development, Sept. 20-21, 2007, The Least Developed Countries Report 2009: The State and Development
Governance, 19, UNCTAD/LDC/2009 (2009), available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/dc2009_en.pdf
[hereinafter UNCTAD Dev. Governance]; see also DEBRAj RAY, DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICs (1998), reprinted
in Ti IE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS ONLINE (Steven N. Durlaf and Lawrence E. Blume
eds., 2d ed. 2008), available at http://www.dictionaryofeconomics.com/article?id=pde2008_D000105&q=
Debraj%20Ray&topicid=&result number=2.
8. See Vernava, supra note 7; see also UNCTAD Trade & Dev., supra note 1, at 12; United Nations Confer-
ence on Trade and Development Sept. 29-Oct. 1, 2003, Case Study On Corporate Governance Disclosures in
Kenya, 4-5, TD/B/COM.2/ISAR/19/Add.3, (Aug. 7, 2003), available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/
c2isarl9a3_en.pdf [hereinafter UNCTAD Case Study]; The World Bank, Legal Aspects, International Develop-
ment Law and Policy Custom Course Packet, 34 [hereinafter World Bank Legal Aspects].
9. See Vernava, supra note 7, at 214.
10. Id.
11. See International Finance Corporation, Financial and Private Sector Development: Securities Markets,
http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/economics.nsf/Content/GCMDSecurities-Markets (last visited Mar. 22, 2010);
International Finance Corporation, ESMID Africa (Efficient Securities Market Institutional Development
Initiative), http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/esmid.nsf [hereinafter ESMID Africa]; International Finance Corpora-
tion, About the Gemloc Program, http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/
EXTFINANCIALSECTOR/0,,contentMDK22213073-menuPK36213500-pagePL210058-piPLC.210062-
theSitePK.282885,00.html [hereinafter Gemloc Program].
12. Alia Yousef, AfDB Presentation: Capital Market Developments in Africa 7 (Citi, May 2009) (transcript
available at http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Generic-Documents/Presentation%20
by%20Alia%20Yousuf%/.20-%20Capital%20Markets%20Development%20in%20Afric.pdf).
13. See Mwenda, supra note 2 (citing A. Galal, L. Jones, P. Tandon & I. Vogelsang, Synthesis of Cases and
Policy Summary, PROCEEDINGS OF THE WORLD BANK CONFERENCE ON THE WELFARE CONSEQUENCES
OF SELLING PUBLIC ENTERPRISES (Washington: World Bank, 1992); International Finance Corporation,
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SSA provided an economic opportunity for European colonialists who, over time, devel-
oped in SSA an exchange economy.15 After breaking free from colonialization, many Afri-
can governments assumed ownership and control over the larger enterprises. Following
structural reforms aimed16 at promoting economic development, SSA governments then
began to privatize some of these holdings.
It is this privatization of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), accomplished through selling
stock of public companies on open markets, that helped form Africa's nascent securities
markets-just as it did in Latin America.17 Although African countries privatized their
SOEs using a variety of means depending on their specific needs and conditions, many
formed stock exchanges to facilitate their endeavors.18
In addition to the development of bond markets, privatization of SOEs, and command-
ments issued forth from the Bretton Woods Institutions, the increased popularity of inter-
national mutual funds, especially from the United States, contributed to market growth to
a small extent.19
Presently, various multilateral and bilateral institutions work to develop Africa's securi-
ties markets, including, e.g., the African Development Bank, the World Bank (including
the International Finance Corporation), and various governmental aid agencies. Their
efforts focus on the identification of obstacles to development, and "encouraging countries
to draw up strategies to overcome [them]," while working with private sector partners. 20
B. CuRURENT CHAIMcTEIsTIcs OF SSA MARKETS
Except for the Johannesburg Stock Exchange and, to a lesser degree, the Nairobi Stock
Exchange,21 SSA markets fail to provide a realistic source of financing for local busi-
nesses. 22 Despite the various forces compelling their growth, even the most advanced
securities markets in SSA remain relatively immature. Much of the trading in these mar-
kets occurs in only a few stocks,23 while levels of private capital investment remain insig-
PRIVArIZATION PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES: LESSONS OF EXPERIENCE SERIES (Washington D.C.: Inter-
national Finance Corporation, 1995)).
14. Currently, Africa holds thirty percent of the planet's mineral resources, including gold, colbalt, manga-
nese, and platinum, and has ten percent of the world's proven oil reserves. See Yousef, supra note 12, at 13.
See also UNCTAD Case Study, supra note 8, at 14 ("arguably the second most endowed continent in the world
in terms of natural resources . . . also ironically by far the poorest").
15. See Nwaobi, supra note 4, at 7.
16. These reforms remain controversial. Some organizations make "assumptions about the superior effi-
ciency of private over public sector and state-owned enterprises," while "[elvidence from the IMF and the
World Bank point to no inherent efficiency advantage of private over public." TUAC & World-PSI, Written
Contribution by TUAC and the Public Services International, Including Comments on Draft OECD Guidelines for
Privatisation (DAF/CA/PRIV(2009) 2), Apr. 23, 2009, available at http://www.uac.org/en/public/e-docs/00/
00/04/B5/document doc.phtml.
17. See Vernava, supra note 7, at 262-63; see also Robert A. Clark, AFRICA'S EMERGING SECURITIES MAR-
IETs: DEVELOPMENTS IN FINANCIAL INFRASTmucruRE 3 (Quorum Books 1998).
18. See Mwenda, supra note 2 (citing R. Penza, DAILY PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES, 18 June 1992, p. 104).
19. See Vernava, supra note 7, at 219-20.
20. AfDB Making Finance Work, supra note 1, at 2.
21. As of 2003, the Nairobi Exchange had fifty-three listed companies and nineteen varieties of govern-
ment treasury bonds. See UNCTAD Case Study, supra note 8, at 9.
22. E.g., id. at 7, 14.
23. See Yartley & Adjasi, supra note 3, at 6; see also UNCTAD Case Study, supra note 8, at 7-8.
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nificant in comparison to the region's GDP.24 Often, the markets provide for the
exchange of stock for only a few large, often family-owned, enterprises. 25 Both illiquid
and severely undercapitalized, 26 SSA markets also commonly lack the kind of benchmark
government bonds required for the development of private-sector debt markets. 27 More-
over, SSA markets tend to provide financing exclusively for "giant conglomerates," like
the South African Anglo-American Corporation and De Beers, which focus their busi-
nesses on natural resource extraction. 28 And only a few private actors possess the financial
wherewithal, knowledge, and desire to purchase the equity of former state-owned
enterprises. 29
Thus, before any necessary structural reforms can make a real difference in economic
growth, Africa's capital markets need to become deep and liquid enough such that they
become a viable alternative for primary finance. 30 Fortunately, a growth stimulant exists
in the form of foreign public pension funds. They will also advance any pending and
nascent reforms aimed to overcome the legal obstacles that deter potential investors. A
description of these legal barriers is set forth in the following paragraphs.
III. Legal Obstacles to Further Development
Of the many factors preventing the further development of SSA's capital markets, legal
impediments certainly play a role. Obstructions to private investment essential to the
further development of markets include a lack of information and disclosure, ineffectual
enforcement of laws meant to ameliorate agency costs, arbitrary justice systems, and pro-
tectionist policies.3' The paragraphs below further explore these topics in more detail.
A. "DEPENDENT DEVELOPMENT" LAWS DISCOURAGE FOREIGN INVESTMENT
After the end of European colonization, many African countries "adopted inward-ori-
ented policies with significant trade restrictions" to protect the "domestic market from
24. See Yartley & Adjasi, supra note 3, at 25.
25. Often, closely-held enterprises will list to take advantage of tax breaks and appear to have no intention
of distributing equity publicly. See, e.g., Clark, supra note 17; see Yousef, supra note 12.
26. See Yartley & Adjasi, supra note 3, at 7. Especially important to development of markets, an adequate
level of liquidity is needed to support basic infrastructure and institutions like brokers, analysts, credit ratings
agencies, etc. Id.; see also, UNCTAD Trade & Dev., supra note 1, at 3, 6 (also showing comparative growth of
SSA markets with those in other developing economies); VennesJansen, Liberalizing Financial Services Trade in
Afica: Going Regional and Multilateral (WTO, Staff Working Paper No. ERSD-2006-03, 2006), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=922013.
27. See Yousef, supra note 12.
28. Mwenda, supra note 2.
29. Id. (observing that Anglo-American Corp., Ltd., "which previously owned most of the shares in the
copper mining companies prior to government take-overs, is likely to buy most of the shares in Zambia
Consolidated Copper Mines Ltd . . . that is now being privatised").
30. See Verava, supra note 7, at 222.
31. See Yartley & Adjasi, supra note 3, at 6. Lack of technologically advanced infrastructure also impedes
growth in certain exchanges. Many markets, for example, continue to use manual settlement and clearance
systems and lack central depositories. Id. at 8-10, 18-19 (also showing a survey of each market's infrastruc-
tural attributes); see also RAY, supra note 7, 1 3.4.
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foreign competition." 32 Vhile such laws protect local economies, they also suppress the
participation of overseas investors. For example, capital account restrictions, i.e., laws lim-
iting the amount of equity a foreign person may own in a company listed in a local ex-
change, discourage foreign capital investments.33 These kinds of regulations do not
simply prevent the involvement of those desirous of obtaining controlling shares in listed
companies, they also serve as a quota. Because the number of companies listed on SSA
exchanges is limited, once the foreign ownership maximum is reached, investors will find
no remaining equity available for purchase.34
Also serving as deterrents are laws curtailing the repatriation of income or otherwise
treating foreigners unfavorably in comparison to local investors. 35 When deciding where
to invest their resources, foreigners will certainly consider any rules that may prevent
them from recouping their earnings. They will also weigh the risk of government appro-
priation of their assets in the name of the "national interest." 36
Not all regulations unfriendly to foreigners are entirely harmful. While "[dieveloping
countries are overcoming historical objections to foreign investment by increasingly be-
ginning to appreciate the benefits of open markets and private initiatives,"37 they may
worry that exclusive reliance on foreign investment risks the occurrence of capital flight
and financial crisis.38 The collapse of the Asian tiger markets in 1997, of course, looms as
a dangerous historical precedent. Therefore, SSA governments must balance any efforts
to attract foreign investors against the risks that arise from substantial dependence on
foreign capital. Accordingly, SSA governments may want to implement capital restric-
tions, currency controls, and other stability-enhancing measures.
32. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Sept. 20-21, 2007, Economic Development in
Africa 2008: Export Performance Following Trade Liberalization, 3, UNCTAD/ALDC/AFRICA/2008 (2008),
available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/aldcafrica2008_en.pdf [hereinafter UNCTAD Export Performance].
33. See Yartley & Adjasi, supra note 3, at 26; see also CAIFORNIA PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' RETIREMENT Sys-
TEM [CAiPERS], STATEMENT OF INVESTMENT POLICY FOR EMERGING MARKET PRINCIPLES, 5 (Nov. 13,
2007), available at http://www.calpers.ca.gov/eip-docs/investments/policies/inv-asset-classes/equity/ext-eq-
uity/emerging-eqty-market-prinicples.pdf [hereinafter CALPERS' EMERGING MARKFT POLICY] (directing
investment managers to avoid markets that restrict foreign ownership of local assets). While "African markets
are opening up to foreign participation with little or no ceilings on foreign ownership of shares," some mar-
kets "still have some foreign participation restrictions. For instance, foreign ownership of shares cannot
exceed 40% in stock markets in Kenya and Zimbabwe and 74% in the Ghana." Yartley & Adjasi, supra note
3, at 26.
34. In addition, capital restrictions may cause a country to accept a higher degree of foreign debt than
necessary and therefore expose them to a greater risk of loss. Allowing international investors to acquire
equity rather than lend money may improve developing countries' economic stability and lower the cost of
capital. See generally Mwenda, snpra note 2.
35. E.g., CALPERS' EMERGING MARKET POLICY, supra note 33 (directing investment managers to avoid
markets that have repatriation restrictions or treat foreigners and locals different under the law). To illustrate
the problem: much of the negotiations surrounding the North Atlantic Free Trade Association (NAFTA)
concerned U.S. investors' fear that Mexico would implement local investment restrictions. See generally
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), ch. 11, Jan. 1, 1994, available at http://www.nafta-sec-
alena.org/en/view.aspx?x=343&mtpilD=142.
36. See, e.g, RAY, supra note 7, 13.4.
37. Mwenda, supra note 2 (citing M.T. Proter, Closed-end Emerging Markets Country Funds Review, THE
WORLD'S EMERGING STOCK MARKETS 461 (KH. Park and W. Van Agtamel, eds., 1993)).
38. See Yartley & Adjasi, supra note 3, at 26.
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B. TRANSPARENCY ISSUES
Despite the significant progress made in overcoming "dependent development" con-
cerns, SSA markets still fail to exhibit the degree of transparency desired by many foreign
investors.39 As evidenced by the plethora of family-owned "publicly traded" companies in
Africa, the lack of a dependable clearinghouse of information and trusted ratings agencies
discourage all but the most local "insider" investors.40 Moreover, the unreliability of fi-
nancial reporting and limited access to company data forces investors to rely on informa-
tion available only at banks and other intermediaries that will inevitably demand their
share of the proceeds. 41 Thus, SSA's lack of transparency increases investors' transaction
costs and, therefore affects its markets' attractiveness to foreign capital. Also suffering
from transparency problems, SSA governments desiring to raise funds through bond issu-
ances "need to improve market access and transparency by providing high-quality infor-
mation about debt structure, funding needs, and debt management strategies." 42
C. RULE OF LAw, CORRUPTION, AND AGENCY PROBLEMS
In addition to transparency and dependent development issues, foreign investors remain
wary of potentially arbitrary and inequitable behavior on the part of governments and
private actors alike. As strangers to indigenous custom, contacts, and communities, many
foreigners suspect that local government officials will treat them unfairly.43 Similarly,
investors worry that self-dealing and inadequate minority shareholder protections may
prevent the fair allocation of resources within a company. Because "[s]tock market devel-
opment is more likely in countries with strong shareholder protection because investors
do not fear expropriation as much,"44 SSA keenly feels the lack of protection. Simply put,
if capital goes to line the pockets of insiders, it is not aiding in the growth of the invest-
ment, nor does it go towards building the infrastructure necessary for development in
general.4s SSA corporate governance rules also suffer from a perceived failure to provide
adequate conflict of interest protections.46 Although adequate protections often exist on
the legislative books, their enforcement may nevertheless remain weak and irregular.47
39. UNCTAD Case Study, supra note 8, at 8, 13 (but noting efforts in 2002 of African nations to develop
improved transparency rules).
40. International Finance Corporation, Financial Infrastructure: Building Access Through Transparent and Sta-
ble Financial Systems (World Bank Group, 2009) (discussing importance of credit ratings agencies and other
information-disseminating services).
41. See UNCTAD Export Performance, supra note 32, at 51; see also Mwenda, supra note 2 (quoting C.B.
Barry & L). Lockwood, New Directions in Research on Emerging Capital Markets, 4 FINANCIAL MAIUrETS,
INSTrrLTEiONS AND INSTRUMENTS, No. 5 (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers 1995)).
42. Nwaobi, supra note 4, at 20.
43. See, e.g., UNCTAD Dev. Governance, supra note 7, at 16; RAY, supra note 7.
44. Yartley & Adjasi, supra note 3, at 17-18 (going on to explain that "the quality of shareholder protection
is correlated with the capitalization and liquidity of stock markets in 49 countries . .. countries with lower
quality of legal rules and law enforcement have smaller and narrower capital markets and that the listed firms
on their stock markets are characterized by more concentrated ownership") (internal citations omitted).
45. See World Bank Legal Aspects, supra note 8, at 32-34.
46. See UNCTAD Case Study, supra note 8, at 13.
47. Id.
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IV. Why the Unique Characteristics of Foreign Public Pension Funds Will
Aid in the Development of Sustainable Securities Markets
Foreign public pension fund investors may be a solution to these legal obstacles. In-
termediaries of undeniable influence and wealth in more developed countries,48 these in-
stitutional investors might lend their market-making power to develop transparent, stable,
and effective markets in SSA. Offering not only a generous source of income, foreign
public pension funds "are at the forefront in promoting efficient market practices and
financial innovation" and "act as a countervailing force to commercial and investment
banks as well as other market intermediaries" that might favor more short-term, unstable
investment strategies.49 Additionally, and importantly, public institutional investors are
more likely than their private-sector counterparts to promote sustainable and socially re-
sponsible development.so
After a brief description of the nature and structure of public pension funds, the follow-
ing paragraphs outline the increasing tendency of such funds to encourage good corporate
governance-an asset that would prove invaluable to developing markets. They also in-
clude a discussion of these funds' potential for supporting responsible, long-term, and
sustainable development. Additionally, a description of possible problems associated with
the encouragement of participation of public institutional investors is provided.
48. Institutional investors represent fifty percent of all equity on U.S. exchanges and forty percent of all
equity on U.K. exchanges. See FNB: Share Ownership Survey 2008, OFFICE FOR NATIONAL STATISTICS 3,
available at httpJ/www.statistics.gov.uk/pdfdir/share01 10.pdf. Indeed, the world's 300 largest pension funds
hold about $6 trillion in assets. Largest The World's 300 Pension Funds, GLOBAL 1NvEsTrmErr RFviEw, 2004,
http://www.watsonwyatt.com/europe/pubs/gim/render2.aspid= 12170.
49. Yartley & Adjasi, supra note 3, at 24; see also Trade Union Advisory Committee [TUAC], Meeting on
Pensions: Dealing with Governance, Market & Political Risks in Times of Crisis, OECD Conference Centre, Paris
(Jul. 8, 2009), available at http://www.tuac.org/en/public/e-docs/00/00/05/18/document-doc.phtml [hereinaf-
ter TUAC Times of Crisis] ("pension funds and other institutional investors may make a greater contribution to
the stability of the financial system in future through greater shareholder activism," especially if that activism
is prophylactic rather than reactionary); Roberta S. Karmel, Stock Markets and the Globalization of Retirement
Savings-implications of Privatization of Government Pensions for Securties Regulators, 33 INr'L LAW. 955, 966
(1999); Mwenda, supra note 2 ("Pension funds are major players in capital markets. Private sector pension
funds will ensure that contributors are free to participate in socio-econo-political reforms"); Cynthia A. Wil-
liams & John M. Conley, An Emerging Third Way? The Erosion of the Anglo-American Shareholder Value Con-
struct, 38 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 493, 499 (2005) ("pension funds ... necessarily have a long-term perspective
on investment risk").
50. This characteristic is particularly important, given that financial institutions in lesser-developed coun-
tries generally prefer to invest in short-term risk-free government securities and not long-term development-
oriented investments. See UNCTAD Dev. Governance, supra note 7, at 79, 81; SURNATIONAL CArrrAL MAR-
KErs IN DEVELOPING COuNTRIES: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE 29 (Mila Freire & John Petersen, eds.,
IBRD, Oxford University Press 2004).
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A. THE STRUCTURE OF PUBLIC PENSION FUNDS 51
Pools of assets purchased by employers and their employees to provide income security
for aging members of a population, 52 public pension funds are complex financial institu-
tions that often possess "multiple tiers of obligations, rules, and regulations."53 They are
supervised entirely by government entities or with significant government involvement,54
although they may nevertheless hire private managers.55 In the United States, for exam-
ple, a board of trustees usually governs a fund, and its members generally include persons
elected by plan members (employees), public officials like state treasurers or city comp-
trollers, and professionals appointed by a government official. The board will set invest-
ment strategy, including policies governing the allocation of the fund's assets and
acceptable levels of risk.56
The very structure of public pension funds encourages them to make investment deci-
sions that encourage sustainable economic development. Because public pension funds
hold themselves accountable to the public, they necessarily choose to invest in a politically
and socially responsible manner. Thus, while public pension fund executives generally
owe a duty to their members to invest prudently,57 they are also morally and practically
accountable to society at large.5 Managers can therefore select investment opportunities
based upon their impact on a wide variety of stakeholders and not just on the bottom line
of the fund's direct beneficiaries. In fact, they often find themselves publicly justifying
investment in unpopular companies and in controversial industries.
51. Pension funds come in many forms, e.g., defined benefit and defined contributions (with individual
accounts), some are funded, others are paid "as you go" through tax revenue or other income sources. The
main difference between such plans is the allocation of risk of loss between the fund manager/employer and
the employee. See, e.g., Patrick S. Cross, Economically Targeted Investments-Can Public Pension Plans Do Good
and Do Well?, 68 IND. LJ. 931, 959 (1993).
52. Joseph J. Norton, Privatization of Public Pension Systems in Developing Nations: A Call for International
Standards, 64 BROOK. L. REv. 817, 827 (1998).
53. Id. at 828. Public pension funds in the United States are governed by state law, either by statute or
judicial law. Private funds, on the other hand, are governed by federal law under the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). Cross, supra note 51, at 952-54.
54. Carmelo Mesa-Lago, Comparative Features and Perfsrmance of Structural Pension Reforns in Latin
America, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 771, 772 (1998); J.W. Verret, Economics Makes Strange Bedfellows: Pensions, Trusts,
and Hedge Funds in an Era of Financial Re-Intermediation, 10 U. PA. J. Bus. & EMp. L. 63, 82 (2007).
55. See Norton, supra note 52, at 851; see also William M. O'Barr & John M. Conley, The Culture ofCapital:
An Anthropological Investigation ofInstitutional Investment, 70 N.C. L. REv. 823 (1992).
56. David Hess, Public Pensions and the Promise ShareholderActivismfor the Next Frontier ofCorporate Govern-
ance: Sustainable Economic Development, 2 VA. L. & Bus. REV. 221, 239-40 (2007).
57. For example, ERISA applies the fiduciary duties found in the common law governing trusts and estates,
e.g., duties of prudence and loyalty, to managers of employee retirement plans. Cross, supra note 51, at 952.
It should be noted that nothing in ERISA or any other U.S. law specifically prevents pension assets from
being invested internationally, including in SSA. The same cannot be said of pension fund laws in other
countries, especially those with emerging markets. Even in Europe, a substantial portion of pension funds
must be invested locally. See Karmel, supra note 49, at 979-80.
58. Verret, supra note 54 ("public pensions [are] uniquely accountable to the electorate").
SUMMER 2010
800 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
B. PUBLIC PENSION FUNDS ARE LONG-TERM INVESTORS WITH LONG-TERM
INTERESTS
The publicly accountable nature of public pension funds is not these investors' only
asset when it comes to the socially responsible development of African securities markets.
Unlike some other kinds of investors, public pension funds make investment choices with
a long-term point of view that will encourage sustainable development. This perspective
arises naturally from the funds' raison d'ftre: to provide long-term retirement benefits for
current and future employees.59 Thus, public pension funds, by their very nature, engage
in long-term thinking.60
Moreover, because these funds' investments often span an entire economy, their inter-
ests are global rather than short-term and local.61 Heavily diversified, and often investing
in index funds, public pension funds will see a profit only by encouraging good long-term
corporate behavior from all market participants. This universal, long-term perspective
ensures that public funds will think twice before making any risky decisions that reap
quick profits at the expense of sustainability.
C. PUBLIC PENSION FUNDS LACK THE CONFLICT OF INTEREST AND SHORT-TERM
THINKING COMMON TO PRIVATE FUNDS
In addition to their long-term philosophy, public pension funds are also more likely
than their private sector counterparts to encourage sustainable development of SSA mar-
kets. Serving constituencies independent from traditional "Wall-Street" interests, pension
funds "lack a conflict of interest with corporations that other institutional investors such as
managers of corporate pension funds may have." 62 Accordingly, they challenge the deci-
sions of corporate boards more frequently than their private-sector counterparts.63 Such
challenges may derive from a public pension investor's interest in developing the long-
term wellbeing of the company and their frustration with corporate management's some-
times single-minded focus on quarterly earnings statements. Private funds, on the other
hand, might even encourage dangerously risky short-termism.M
59. Hess, supra note 56, at 235.
60. See, e.g., Cross, supra note 51, at 960 ("The very nature of pension funds-a generally long investment
horizon combined with the predictability of future liabilities many years in advance-makes it possible for
funds 'to employ long-term investment strategies and to utilize investments with long maturities that match
their long-term liabilities'"); see O'Barr & Conley, supra note 55, at 831 (describing funds with strategies to
"buy quality and hold").
61. See Hess, supra note 56, at 235.
62. Id. at 235; O'Barr & Conley, supra note 55, at 843 (describing several examples of such conflicts, e.g.,
when "you are running the pension fund for your company and you are dealing with stocks that are, compa-
nies that are competitors to your own company"); Verret, supra note 54, at 66.
63. See Hess, supra note 56, at 235; see also O'Barr & Conley, supra note 55, at 842-43 (private funds do not
like to "meddle" in corporate governance, unlike public funds). But because public pension funds "typically
delegate fund management to investment professionals who may not share those long-term perspectives or
who are under their own short term competitive pressures," some conflict of interest may nevertheless re-
main. Williams & Conley, supra note 49, at 537-38; see also O'Barr & Conley, supra note 55, at 840-41
(suggesting that the quarterly-reporting, electronic-correspondence structure of markets may force even the
most well-meaning funds into short-termism).
64. Monkia Queisser, Pension Reform: Lemnnsfrom Latin America, 5 NAFTA L. & Bus. REv. AM. 544, 551
(1999). See also Sanford M. Jacoby, The Future ofLabor and Finance, 30 Coxip. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. Ill, 115-
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Indeed, history indicates that private-sector investors often focus only on the short-
term bottom line. For example, in 2003, when the U.S. Securities and Exchange Com-
mission attempted to promulgate disclosure rules for institutional investors regarding
their proxy voting policies, private sector funds protested vigorously while public pension
funds overtly lobbied for its implementation.65 Common wisdom speculated that private
sector funds, in choosing to protest, worried about public reaction to their lack of dili-
gence, oversight, and commitment to minimum ethical standards. Simply, they did not
want the world to know they were falling down on the job.
In sum, private funds' conflict of interest with corporate management, along with their
penchant for short-term profits, indicates that they likely will not serve as the most suita-
ble market-maker for nascent and vulnerable securities markets. Public funds, in contrast,
do not suffer from these kinds of impediments.
D. FuNos HAvE THE CAPACITY AND CLOUT To DEMAND TRANSPARENCY AND
SOUND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
Foreign public pension fund investors offer more than a long-term and publicly-ac-
countable outlook that will encourage SSA companies to pursue sustainable business poli-
cies. If enticed to Africa, the capacity and motivation of public pension funds to pursue
governance reforms will also encourage the participation of other investors. Moreover,
the funds' sheer size can overcome some lingering institutional weaknesses in SSA's capi-
tal markets.
Following the Enron and WorldCom debacles in the United States, and similar contro-
versies in Europe, public institutional shareholders began, for the first time, asserting their
rights under corporate governance law to substantially influence managerial decision-
making.66 Frustrated with perceived corporate greed, fraud, and short-termism, these
"activist shareholders" started throwing their weight around corporate boardrooms by
launching proxy campaigns and pressuring political leaders to change governance rules to
permit more shareholder involvement.67 Indeed, public institutional investors now have
more voice than ever before in the management and behavior of the companies in which
they invest.68 Accordingly, one can expect that these foreign public institutional investors
16 (2008) ("The oft-repeated mantra of the worker-owner approach [to investing] is to seek governance and
investment practices that create long-term value instead of quick returns").
65. Williams & Conley, supra note 49, at 527-28.
66. See generally, Jacoby, supra note 64 (also observing the validation of such activism following the 2008
financial crash); see also O'Barr & Conley, supra note 55, at 829 (describing such activity in the case of a
particular fund); Verret, supra note 54, at 66 ("Though corporate activism is not uncommon, it has tended to
come mostly from public pensions such as [CalPERS]"). Individual investors, unlike institutional investors,
"suffer from a collective action problem since it is not cost effective for any one shareholder to undertake
monitoring on his or her own." Id. at 64. Therefore, the growth in size and number of institutional investors
made it much more likely that shareholders would begin to assert themselves in corporate management.
67. O'Barr & Conley, supra note 55, at 842 (describing involvement of New York and California state
pension funds in Texaco, Lockheed, GM, and other major corporations, including requests for board seats for
institutional investors).
68. Their influence continues to grow. For example, the "Shareholder Bill of Rights" introduced by Sena-
tor Charles Schumer in July 2009, would force all public companies to adopt majority-voting policies. Share-
holder Bill of Rights Act of 2009, S.1074, 11Ith Cong. (2009). The House of Representatives passed a similar
bill in October. New NYSE Rule 452 eliminates broker discretionary voting. NYSE, Inc., Giving Proxies by
SUMMER 2010
802 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
will demand strong and effective transparency and anti-fraud regulations in Africa as well.
And any such regulatory improvement will benefit, and therefore attract, other market
participants. 69
Evidence indicates that public funds can make a substantial impact in governance re-
form. For example, the California Public Employee Retirement System (CalPERS), the
biggest public pension fund in the United States, "restricts or prohibits investment in
countries with poor records on issues such as financial transparency, political stability, and
labor practices."o7 In the United Kingdom, institutional investors published standards
demanding that portfolio companies "disclose information about their social and environ-
mental risks and about their management systems."7' They also formed coalitions among
governmental groups and non-governmental organizations to address government cor-
ruption in emerging economies. 72 Likewise, in Latin America following the privatization
reforms of the 1990s, the introduction of investing pension funds caused increased trans-
parency in other areas of the financial sector.7 3 Pressures exerted by these funds certainly
help to overcome any political opposition to reform. SSA can take advantage of these
pressures.
In addition, public pension funds can serve as substitutes for missing vital institutions.
A common complaint regarding SSA's markets involves the lack of a reliable credit report-
ing agency as well as a general lack of information about investment opportunities. A
fund, however, might expand its own considerable resources to discover exceptional busi-
ness ventures in which to invest rather than rely upon suboptimal communications net-
works or nonexistent or ineffective credit ratings agencies. Faced with the same
information opacity, on the other hand, individuals might choose badly or elect not to
invest at all. Thus, institutional investors can serve as their own credit-reporting agency
while, at the same time, providing much-needed information to other market participants.
Indeed, "[i]nvestment funds are excellent means of providing individuals with affordable,
expert investment advice, and for mobilizing capital, especially equity capital, from broad
sectors of the population."74
Accordingly, public funds' potential to pressure corporate leadership and SSA govern-
ments into enacting meaningful and effective governance reforms, as well as their ability
to improve transparency and the availability of corporate information, makes them an
asset of great potential for SSA securities markets.
Member Organization Rule 452 (2009), available at httpJ/www.nyse.com/Frameset.html?displayPage=http://
rules.nyse.com/NYSE/Help/Map/rules-sys468.html. And the SEC recently set forth for comment a pro-
posed proxy access regulation under Rule 14a-1 1. Security Holder Director Nominations (proposed May 20,
2009) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. 240.14a-11).
69. See Hess, supra note 56, at 236.
70. Id. at 238; see also CALPERS' EMERGING MARKEr PoLIcy, supra note 33, at 3-5.
71. Williams & Conley, supra note 49.
72. Id.
73. See Queisser, supra note 64, at 556-57 (observing that financial disclosure must be made according to
international standards while establishing continuous monitoring).
74. Richard K Gordon, A Recipe for Effecting Institutional Change to Achieve Privatization, 13 B.U. LNr'L L.
J. 367, 369 (1995).
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E. PUBLIC PENSION FuNDs POSSESS THE DESIRE To ENCOURAGE SUSTAINABLE AND
RESPONSIBLE DEVELOPMENT
Because public pension funds possess the power to pressure corporate boards and regu-
lators to adopt good governance rules, and because they take a special interest in investing
responsibly, they are uniquely positioned to encourage the sustainable development of
SSA's capital markets. Public institutional investors, having gained authority in corporate
boardrooms, do not exercise their new position of influence solely to change practices in
traditional "corporate governance" subjects like executive compensation, accounting accu-
racy, and anti-takeover measures. Their interests also expand into "so-called non-finan-
cial criteria, or in other words, sustainability." 75 Therefore, SSA markets can utilize
public pension funds' ability to improve corporate governance and their desire to invest in
enterprises that will encourage the sustainable and equitable growth of SSA.
SSA can count on foreign public pension fund investors to consider more than merely
their members' bottom line. Indeed, "sustainable economic development is receiving
greater recognition as an issue in long-term shareholder value."7 6 Traditionally, Anglo-
American corporate governance laws aim solely at maximizing shareholder profits.77
However, the current Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) movement has become "a
major factor in moving corporate governance theory in the stakeholder direction by de-
manding that companies go beyond the creation of short-term shareholder wealth in pur-
suit of broader objectives" 78 like equitable employment practice and long-term social and
environmental well-being.79 For example, public pension funds boycotted business in
apartheid South Africa and refused to invest in companies that produce harmful products
like tobacco and nuclear weapons.80
Furthermore, U.S. public pension funds, holding about ten percent of the U.S. equity
market, "are heavily involved" in sustainable development projects.81 Retirement funds
for New York City routinely file social and environmental proposals, including those that
address sustainability and international labor standards, with dozens of corporations. Pen-
sion funds from California and Ohio likewise launched proxy campaigns addressing the
long-term profitability and environmental impact of their investments. 82 Many also focus
75. Hess, supra note 56, at 223; see also, e.g., CALPERS, GLOBAL PRINCIPLES OF AccoUNTABLE CORLPO-
RATE GOVERNANCE, 17-18 (Mar. 20, 2009) [hereinafter CALPERS GLOBAL PRINCIPLES] (outlining invest-
ment principles regarding sustainability and corporate social responsibility); see also O'Barr & Conley, supra
note 55, at 838-39 (some funds view socially-conscious investing as proper under standard of care established
under ERISA). But, critics argue that "[plension fund advocacy of shareholder primary" is arguably common
and "stems from a latent trade-union consciousness: squeeze managements to get the goods for plan mem-
bers." See Jacoby, supra note 64, at 113 (also observing the validation of such activism following the 2008
financial crash).
76. Hess, supra note 56, at 224-25.
77. See Williams & Conley, supra note 49, at 494, 499.
78. Id. at 494.
79. Id. at 495; see also, e.g., Jacoby, supra note 64, at 116 (long-term investments tend to treat employees as
assets in which the corporation should invest, and "encourages companies to pay attention to future liabilities
in areas such as employment regulation and the looming global climate situation."). For a discussion of the
CSR movement, see generally Cross, supra note 51.
80. Cross, supra note 51, at 934-35.
81. Hess, supra note 56, at 225.
82. Id. at 236-37.
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their investments locally, striving to improve communities as a whole rather than merely
maximizing their balance sheets.83 For example, The AFL-CIO funds, representing six
trillion U.S. dollars in capital market equity, promulgated proxy-voting guidelines sug-
gesting that fund managers vote in favor of shareholder proposals that support local com-
munities, working families, and long-term investment.84 Meanwhile, in the United
Kingdom, pressure exerted by pension funds encourages "broader thinking about stake-
holder interests" like climate-change and other long-term risks.85 Indeed, "a substantial
percentage of institutional investment financial managers in the UK are affiliated with
socially responsible investment networks (SRI) or informal SRI collaborations." 86 Efforts
like these can only aid the responsible growth of SSA's economy.
Thus, given the concurrent emergence of shareholder activism and CSR, pension funds
are uniquely positioned to assume leadership in the socially responsible and sustainable
development of emerging securities markets in Africa.87
F. POTENTIAL PROBLEMS
Although foreign public pension funds have much to offer, not everyone will welcome
their involvement. Negative public perceptions regarding powerful foreign investors may
obstruct funds' access to SSA capital markets.88 For example, just as institutional investors
can pressure market participants to accept and obey transparency and governance rules,
locals might fear that they could also "establish institutions that make it easier to dominate
those [local financial institutions] that have fewer resources." 89 Furthermore, domestic
labor groups may grow concerned that "intermediaries [like institutional investors] will
squeeze the employment rolls [of issuers] to maximize investor returns."9
Accordingly, domestic public pressure may obligate SSA governments to incorporate
special protections for smaller investors, workers, and other constituents by, for example,
imposing on public pension funds certain disclosure requirements regarding conflicts of
interest, business principles, and financial health.91 Governments could also pass legisla-
tion impeding companies' ability to decrease employees' salaries, commit to layoffs, or
83. CALPERS, CALPERS' ANNUAL INVESTMENT REPORT, FiscAL YEAR ENDED 6.30.08, 1 (2008), https:/
/www.calpers.ca.gov/mss-pub/SearchController?viewpackage=action&Pageld=SearchCatalog&package-
code=1420 (last visited Apr. 1, 2010).
84. See Williams & Conley, supra note 49, at 528.
85. Id. at 499.
86. Id. Such efforts appear consistent with Europe's common "Lisbon Strategy" for development, emanat-
ing from the European Council in 2000, that promotes throughout the continent "economic growth, social
cohesion and environmental protection." TUAC, Communication from the Commission to the Gothenburg
European Council, A Sustainable Europe for a Better World: A European Union Strategy for Sustainable Develop-
ment, 2, COM(2001) 264.
87. Hess, supra note 56, at 225.
88. See Verret, supra note 54, at 66 (in context of comparison between relative acceptance of institutional
investors in Germany and Japan, and distrust in the United States, due largely to cultural acceptance of large
conglomerations of financial power).
89. Bo Rothstein, Preventing Markets from Self-Destruction: The Quality of Government Factor, 2, 6 (Univ. of
Gothenberg, Quality of Gov't Working Paper Series, 2009) (in context of the most recent financial crisis, but
relevant nevertheless); see also UNCTAD Trade & Dev., supra note 1, at 3-4.
90. Verret, supra note 54, at 65.
91. See Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Revision ofthe OECD Principles ofCorpo-
rate Governance, 61, 3, 11, 22 (OECD, Apr. 13, 2004) [hereinafter OECD Principles] (new principles call on
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undergo other cost-cutting measures that might increase investors' short-term dividend
income. Such government action would deter foreign investors looking to avoid transac-
tion costs and competitive disadvantages.
In addition to concerns regarding the "foreignization" of local industry, the recruitment
of foreign public pension fund investors might only serve to concentrate savings into a
relatively few, stable, large domestic industries. Foreign investors, leery of risk, will surely
hesitate before handing over members' retirement savings to smaller and relatively un-
known and untried African entrepreneurs. 92 Therefore, while attracting the involvement
of public pension fund investors provides a solution to the development problem, it can-
not serve as the only solution.
V. Attracting Pension Funds That Will Aid Development
Currently, the benefits of incorporating the resources and agendas of foreign public
pension fund investors into SSA markets remain merely prospective. Yet SSA govern-
ments might entice their involvement by creating marketable investment opportunities.
They can also consolidate and harmonize their existing markets to decrease listing costs.
Moreover, emerging market countries should implement adequate corporate governance
and transparency regulations as well as equitable, even-handed enforcement regimes. 93
Such reforms are discussed in more detail in section V(C), infra. Furthermore, enacting
rules specifically favoring long-term investors will help attract public pension funds and
other investors with similar agendas.94 These and other suggested reforms are addressed
in more detail below.
A. THE DEVELOPMENT OF LIQIJDYTY-BUILDING Low-RISK INVESTMENTS
The establishment and sale of low-risk investments on SSA securities markets can im-
prove liquidity and encourage more widespread market participation, including that of
risk-averse, long-term public pension fund investors. Specifically, the development of
government securities in a "limited number of popular, standard maturities" may create
institutional investors to disclose their corporate governance policies, how they decide on the use of their
voting rights, and how they manage conflicts of interest that may compromise their voting).
92. See Vernava, supra note 7, at 264-65 (in the context of Latin American markets).
93. CA.PERS' EMERGING MARKEr POLICY, supra note 33, at 2-5 (instructing investment managers to
consider various corporate governance factors when determining whether to invest in an emerging market);
see also KK MWENDA, LEGAL ASPECTS OF FINANCIAL SERVICES REGULATION AND THE CONCEPT OF A
UNIFIED REGULATOR 3 (The World Bank, Washington, D.C. 2006) [hereinafter MWENDA LEGAL ASPECTS]
("Though there is admittedly no unified theory of financial services regulation, the following comprise some
broad objectives for regulation: Protecting investors to help build their confidence in the market; Ensuring
that the markets are fair, efficient, and transparent . . . ."); Yartley & Adjasi, supra note 3, at 24.
94. TUAC Submission to the OECD, Written Contribution by the TUAC to the Directorate for Financial and
Enterprise Affairs, Steering Group on Corporate Governance, 2, DAF/CA/CG/RD(2009)13 (Oct. 28, 2009), avail-
able at http-//www.ruac.org/en/publicle-docs/00/00/05/B3/document_doc.phtnl [hereinafter Trade Union
Submission].
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liquidity. 95 It might also, incidentally, raise much-needed funding for development
projects.
To facilitate the formation of a thriving bond market, SSA governments and develop-
ment organizations could sponsor municipal bond insurance programs.96 Increased avail-
ability of low-risk sub-sovereign bonds would not only increase the depth of local markets
and provide stable investments for pension fund investors, but also serve as benchmark
securities.97 In fact, the Bretton Woods Institutions already launched efforts to build such
bond markets in Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, and Rwanda. 98
In addition to government bond issuances, securities derived from micro-finance instru-
ments, that is, "credit services for economically active low-income people,"99 might also
provide the increased liquidity and capitalization needed to attract foreign investors. 00
They would also help ensure the availability of finance for smaller or mid-sized enter-
prises.o'0 The prospects for successfully establishing these kinds of securities are good:
demand for them is high and no enterprise has yet to corner the market.102 Given the
historic profitability of, and high demand for, microfinance, its securitization will provide
an enticing investment for funds and, importantly, encourage investment in local
enterprises.o 3
Bretton Woods and other development-minded institutions might also provide a guar-
antee vehicle through which public pension fund investors could be assured that they
would never lose all of their investments. By leveraging the collective wealth of the
world's developed economies, SSA markets could make their equities and bonds more
attractive and, therefore, increase participation.104
B. REGIONAL INTEGRATION
Those desiring the development of SSA capital markets can do more than merely pro-
vide low risk "starter" investments. They can, by expanding SSA securities markets
through integration, increase liquidity, realize efficiencies and economies of scale, aid in
price discovery, 05 and perhaps discourage local cronyism (for example, creating markets
95. Nwaobi, supra note 4, at 20. Currently, "[aluctions are the most common method for the sale of gov-
ernment securities in most domestic markets." See Trade Union Submission, supra note 94; see also Gemloc
Program, supra note 11.
96. See generally, Kathleen S. McArthur, Multilateral-Sponsored Municipal Bond Insurance: A New Approach to
Promoting Infrastructure and Capital Market Development in Latin America, 12 LAW & Bus. REv. AM. 3 (2006).
97. Id. at 6.
98. ESMID Africa, supra note I1.
99. Nwaobi, supra note 4, at 25.
100. See, e.g., UNCTAD Trade &r Dev., supra note 1, at 7, 10 (including the observation that there is "increas-
ing interest by commercial banks and private investors (including funds) aiming to exploit" the microfinance
market in Africa); UNCTAD Erport Performance, supra note 32, at 41.
101. See UNCTAD Dev. Governance, supra note 7, at 81.
102. Nwaobi, supra note 4, at 26 ("Common to nearly all parts of the developing world [] is a lack of
commercial micro finance institutions," including those that "finance their loan portfolios ... [by] [accessing]
commercial debt and for-profit investment . . .").
103. LNCTAD Dev. Governance, supra note 7, at 81.
104. Credit goes to Professor Sophie Smyth, Professor, Temple University Beasley School of Law, for this
suggestion.
105. Yartley & Adjasi, supra note 3, at 21-22. See also Mwenda, supra note 2. Some of the efficiencies prove
particularly attractive given the relative political and social weakness of eastern and southern Africa.
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just to afford "tax breaks" to favored industries).10 6 By expanding the pool of investors,
regionalization will also spread market risks among a larger number of participants. 0 7
Already recognizing the potential benefits of regionalization, a number of SSA securi-
ties exchanges harmonized their listing rules as well as their trading and settlement sys-
tems. Other exchanges entered into Memoranda of Understanding that allow qualifying
issuers to list simultaneously. 08 Further regionalization, however, requires more legal
harmonization, that is, a reconciliation of accounting and reporting standards. 09 It also
requires greater currency convertibility-a major obstacle, as many SSA countries do not
enjoy enough foreign trade to establish reliable and dependable exchange rates."10 An
integrated financial and monetary policy will further enable regionalization,"I and a sin-
gle multilateral supervisory agency able to regulate all financial and securities markets
might increase the markets' effectiveness and efficiency. 112 A cooperative effort to prose-
cute regulatory violations and enforce judgments, perhaps through a treaty, is also
necessary.13
While offering many potential benefits in reducing costs and increasing resources, re-
gionalization does have some drawbacks. For example, it may reallocate needed local re-
sources towards development in foreign countries. Indeed, countries "fear that their
exchanges will be overshadowed by the bigger exchanges [and that] capital may be di-
verted away from them to the bigger economies . . . ."l14 Moreover, smaller companies
106. E.g., Yousef, supra note 12.
107. Yartley & Adjasi, supra note 3, at 22.
108. Id. at 23. Much harmonization consists of a convergence towards the rules implemented by the Johan-
nesburg Stock Exchange, which is also the main counterparty for most, if not all, of the existing MOU. Id.;
see also Mwenda, supra note 2 (describing harmonization efforts made in 1999).
109. See Sam Mensah, Executive Secretary, Afian Capital Markets Forum, The Promotion ofRegional Capital
Markets in Afica, OAU/AEC, 3 (2000), available at http://www.semfinancial.com/publications/The%20
Promotion%20of/o20Regional%20Capital%20Markets%20In%20Africa.pdf; Mwenda, supra note 2 (noting
also that disclosure requirements also prove costly and that therefore harmonization will encourage listing on
more exchanges); see also Vernava, supra note 7, at 233.
110. Mensah, supra note 109; Mwenda, supra note 2; Yartley & Adjasi, supra note 3, at 24 (but also noting
that countries involved in existing monetary unions, like the WAEMU and SADC, may avoid this problem).
111. CALPERS' EMERGING MARKET POLICY, supra note 33, at 3 (when making an investment decision,
fund considers "the extent to which governmental monetary and fiscal policies and implementation are pub-
licly available in a clear and timely manner, in accordance with international standards"); Mwenda, supra note
2 ("Eastern and Southern African states must consider the prospects of harmonizing their monetary and fiscal
policies") (citing interview with Mr. Mumba Kapumpa, Chief Executive, Securities and Exchange Counis-
sion, in Lusaka, Zambia (Dec. 18, 1996); Leon Myburgh, AfDB Presentation: The Rule of Regulation in
Development Bond Markets 2 (Citi, May 2009), available at http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/
Documents/Generic-Documents/Presentation%20by%2OLeon%20Myburgh%20-%20The%2ORole%20of
%20Regulation%20in%2ODeveloping%2OBond%20Markets.ppt); Mensah, supra note 109.
112. See generally, EDGARDo DEMAEsTsu & DIEGO SOURROUILLE, INTEGRATED FINANCIAL SUPERVISION:
EXPERIENCES IN SELECTED COUNTRIES (Inter-American Dev. Bank 2003) (describing countries and their
laws that integrate financial, banking, securities, monetary regulation, as well as noting that the regulatory
agencies enjoy relative independence from governments).
113. Mwenda, supra note 2 (citing, inter alia, The European Convention On Jurisdiction And The Enforce-
ment of Judgments 1968, 1998 OJ. (C 27) 26; ANDREA LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL LrIGATION AND
ARBfRArION, 368-450 (St. Paul, Minnesota: West Publishing Co., 1993)); Henry v. Geoprosco Int'l Ltd.
(1976) Q.B. 726 (C.A.) (U.K.); Somportex Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp. 405 U.S. 1017 (1972)).
114. Yartley & Adjasi, supra note 3, at 22.
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may lack the financial wherewithal to satisfy presumably more burdensome listing
requirements.1s
C. EFFECTIVE AND EQUITABLE REGULATION AND ENFORCEMENT OF INVESTOR
PROTECTIONS ("CORPORATE GOVERNANCE")
The regionalization of exchanges and the provision of low-risk securities might entice
the involvement of public pension fund investors. Necessary, however, is the implementa-
tion of effective investor protection and corporate governance regimes. To appeal to
long-term, patient capital, SSA capital markets must embrace "good corporate govern-
ance" precepts as they are necessary to "market confidence, integrity and efficiency"' 6
while promoting "economic growth and ... financial stability."' 1 7 Also essential are equi-
table and effective investor protection mechanisms that guard against self-dealing and the
opportunistic behavior of insiders." 8 Likewise, a "well structured and clear rule of law,
within an efficient judicial system," will prevent arbitrary expropriation of property and
insider abuses." 9
Unfortunately, overhauling a legal regime is not easy. The amount and complexity of
"legal 'software"' essential to the creation and maintenance of sustainable stock markets
often proves overwhelming.120 Questions range from "market ownership, to oversight of
trading, settlement methods, and capital requirements for entry."'21 All require hard pol-
icy choices, extensive expertise, and a substantial commitment of time and resources. Ad-
ding complexity, while regulation "must follow international best practices," it must "at
the same time reflect local structures and needs."122 Nevertheless, regardless of the
choices made, so long as "the regulatory framework effectively controls market abuses,
such as unlawful and unauthorized disclosures [and] insider dealing . . . prospects for
building investor and consumer confidence in the market are high." 23
115. See Mwenda, supra note 2 (citing interview with Mr. Mebeelo Mutukwa, stockbroker and Managing
Director, Pangea Securities Ltd. in Lusaka (Dec. 11, 1996)).
116. Grant Kirkparick, Improving Corporate Governance Standards: The Work of the OECD and the Principles,
OECD, http://www.globalcorporategovemance.com/045_049.htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2010).
117. OECD Principles, supra note 91, at 2, 11; see also, e.g., Richard E. Messick, Judicial Refnrm and Economic
Development: A Survey of the Isrues, 14 WoRLD BANK OBSERVER 117, 120 (Feb. 1999); UNCTAD Trade 6s
Dev., supra note 1, at 12. Whether well-functioning "western style" judicial and legal systems operate to
encourage development in culturally, geographically, and historically diverse countries is yet to be proven
with certainty. It is possible, for example, that extra-judicial systems of the enforcement of social norms will
serve just as, if not more, effectively. See Messick, supra note 117, at 126-27 (in the context of the "law and
development" period in the 1960s). Indeed, even in the "West," non-judicial norm enforcers abound: credit
ratings agencies, the press, accountants, and auditors. Id. at 128. Nevertheless, the implementation of a well-
functioning judicial and legal system will attract foreign investors. See id. at 121-22.
118. Yartley & Adjasi, supra note 3, at 24.
119. Id. at 25.
120. Gordon, supra note 74, at 370.
121. Id.
122. Yartley & Adjasi, supra note 3, at 25; see also MWENDA, LEGAL ASPECTS, supra note 93, at 6, 9, 11 (the
form of regulatory authority must reflect the size and structure of a particular industry and the role of regula-
tors in that country; country-specific factors may affect systemic risk and contagion of financial crises).
123. MwENAt, LEGAL ASPECTS, supra note 93 (also observing that "lilnvestors tend to target markets that
protect them against such risks . . . .").
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The international consensus on investor protection standards, useful as a starting point
in building a governance regime, is outlined below. Following is a discussion of sources of
conflict arising from cultural and historical differences.
1. The Consensus on Corporate Governance Standards
a. Shareholder Rights and Management Duties
Established public pension funds will expect protections comparable to those they re-
ceive in their home markets. Many developed-countries' company laws, for example, af-
ford shareholders voting rights over key corporate decisions like business combinations,
sales of major operating assets, and the seating of governing boards.124 The Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)125 likewise advocates shareholder
input over executive compensation packages.126 To avoid unnecessary deterrence of over-
seas investment, moreover, corporate laws must handle both foreign and domestic equity
owners with equal treatment.127
In addition to shareholder rights, public pension fund investors will expect laws estab-
lishing minimum standards of behavior for corporate management. For example, inves-
tors may view the strict regulation of conflicts of interest as particularly important, 28
given the perceived family-oriented management of many SSA corporations. Similarly,
the securities laws of many relatively more developed markets regulate the application of
management-entrenchment devices, that is, anti-takeover devices like "poison pills,"
"dead hands," and other "shareholder rights plans."' 29
b. Regulatory Infrastructure
Good laws alone will not comfort apprehensive foreign investors. Indeed,
"[s]upervisory, regulatory and enforcement authorities" are also necessary and "should
have the authority, integrity and resources to fulfill their duties . . . [and] their rulings
should be timely, transparent and fully explained." 30
Unfortunately, in SSA, "[a] common criticism ... is that many regulators lack the re-
sources they need to fulfill their functions."'31 Without financial support and a function-
ing infrastructure, regulators may find themselves subject to the whims of politicians and
124. OECD Principles, supra note 91, at 3, 10-11; see also, Karmel, supra note 49.
125. The OECD is a convention of more developed countries whose goal is to, inter alia, support sustainable
economic growth. See OECD, About OECD, http://www.oecd.org/pages/0,3417,en_36734052_36734103-
1ll_1.,00.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2010).
126. OECD Principles, supra note 91, at 3. Similar opinions regarding shareholder "say on pay" are found in
several bills pending in the U.S. Congress introduced by Senators Schumer and Dodd. See, e.g., S. 1074.
127. OECD Principles, supra note 91, at 19, 40.
128. Id. at 51.
129. Id. at 36.
130. OECD Principles, supra note 91, at 17; MWENDA, LEGAL ASPECTS, supra note 93, at 12 ("Most effective
regulatory bodies, whatever the jurisdiction in which they operate, have clear responsibilities and objectives,
adequate powers, adequate resources, transparency, and accountability."); Gordon, supra note 74, at 372
("Without competent personnel, legal software and hardware will sit unused, or will be used poorly."); Yousef,
supra note 12, at 18 (important for Nigeria to establish and strengthen market regulators).
131. MWENDA, LEGAL ASPECTS, supra note 93, at 13 (going on to state that "[1]ack of resources can com-
promise a regulator's independence if the regulator is heavily reliant on the state to fund its operations.").
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industry actors. 132 In addition to adequate resources, those administering and executing
corporate governance laws must possess a sufficient amount of technical proficiency and
experience.' 33 Currently, SSA markets lack the optimal amount of skilled and knowledge-
able employees capable of acting in a regulatory capacity.
Regulators should also enjoy a minimum degree of independence. They must have the
ability to perform their duties free from conflicts of interest and their actions should be
subject to independent review.134 Moreover, to assuage investors' concerns, regulators
must also possess autonomy from political and industry influence. 135 The law should like-
wise shield regulators from any liability that might arise from the good faith, lawful dis-
charge of their duties so that they may "perform diligently, competently, independently
and professionally, without fear that they will be sued."136
c. Consistent and Effective Enforcement of Corporate Governance Policies
Stringent legislation and skilled, well-resourced regulators are not sufficient to ensure
the effective implementation of good corporate governance policies. No matter the cor-
porate governance rules promulgated, SSA countries must ensure their consistent and uni-
form enforcement.137 Regularity and predictability will encourage foreign capital, while
arbitrary and inequitable behavior will surely repel would-be investors.138
To effectively enforce market participants' rights and regulations, the consensus insists
on the creation of an independent and influential enforcement body. For example,
"[m]any countries today consider enforcement ... to be [a] part of the function of [the]
regulator."139 To implement an independent executive function, however, such a regula-
tor must possess powers to inspect, investigate, perform surveillance, impose sanctions,
and, depending on the jurisdiction, sue violators in court.'*
In addition to a well-functioning government enforcer, "[e]xperience has shown that an
important determinant of the degree to which shareholder rights are protected is whether
effective methods exist to obtain redress for grievances at a reasonable cost and without
excessive delay."i 41 Thus, by implementing private rights of action for violations and en-
132. See id. at 19-21.
133. See Messick, supra note 117, at 124-25 (noting the strengthening institutions through, inter alia, train-
ing and resources); see also MWENDA, LEGAL ASPECTS, supra note 93, at 13 ("The lack of appropriately
qualified human capital is a notable constraint on regulatory agencies, especially in developing countries and
emerging countries.").
134. OECD Principles, supra note 91, at 53-56.
135. MWENDA, LEGAL ASPEcrs, supra note 93, at 14, 19, 21 (including, for example, provisions for financial
incentives for regulators so as to discourage bribery). Moreover, a regulator that "is too susceptible to politi-
cal direction or pressure can end up exacerbating economic cycles." Id. at 22.
136. Id. at 13.
137. UNCTAD Case Study, supra note 8, at 14-15.
138. To illustrate: much of the NAFTA negotiations between the United States and Mexico focused around
"arbitrary" government takings of foreign-owned assets.
139. MWENDA, LEGAL ASPECTS, supra note 93, at 16.
140. Id. at 13; Myburgh, supra note 111, at 5.
141. OECD Principles, supra note 91, at 40 (the annotations go on to note that "[t]he confidence of minority
investors is enhanced when the legal system provides mechanisms for minority shareholders to bring lawsuits
when they have reasonable grounds to believe that their rights have been violated").
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suring that such redress is easily accessible, countries might enjoy a greater degree of
compliance with their corporate governance laws.142
2. Adjustment of Standards to Accommodate Local Cultural, Social, and Economic Needs
While the leadership of developed countries may embrace the common wisdom regard-
ing good governance, its principles may not translate perfectly with regard to emerging
markets in SSA. Simply, these reforms may not prove effective or helpful given local
culture and norms.' 4 3
For example, while Western thought emphasizes the importance of maintaining an in-
dependent regulator, in countries transitioning from command economies, "there might
be good reason for the government to intervene occasionally and strategically" in circum-
stances involving important firms.144 Politically, moreover, a heavily subsidized securities
market cannot "stray" "far from the Government's national development agenda . . .. 145
In addition, in certain countries, independent regulators might "tend to respond to the
wishes of the best-organized interest groups." 4 6 Elites can "collude and purchase, or un-
duly influence the rules of the game, shape the institutions, the policies and [the] regula-
tions and the laws for their own private [benefit]."4 7 In markets with special interests or
industries expressing goals incongruous with those of potential investors, therefore, the
formation of an independent regulator may create more problems than it solves.
Foreign investors may also have to swallow some form of protectionism. SSA govern-
ments will worry that foreign investment will displace local industry and savings. Indeed,
any improvement of the efficiency and capability of local markets may encourage foreign
firms to exploit local sources of capital, stealing money away from local industry.'4 8 SSA
countries may also prefer to empower domestic constituencies by, for example, requiring
listing companies to give local employees a voice on corporate boards.149
In addition to the risk that corporate governance reform will favor the investments of
foreigners at the expense of domestic business, indigenous custom and circumstances may
neutralize its efficacy or, in the worst case, render it harmful. At a minimum, lawmakers
should therefore seek to implement corporate governance and transparency rules that bol-
ster-or at least do not subvert-these existing cultural norms. 5 0 For example, "rigid com-
142. E.g., Fianna Jesover, Senior Policy Manager, Corp. Affairs Div., OECD, Presentation at the OECD-
ADBI Tenth Roundtable on Capital Market Reform in Asia, Corporate Governance Aspects ofthe Crisis: OECD's
Experience "The Only Constant is Change Itselfl", (Mar. 2-3, 2009), available at http://www.adbi.org/files/2009.
03.3.cpp.session.6.1.jesover.corporate.governance.oecd.pdf; see also Joseph H.H. Weiler, The Transformation of
Europe, 100 YALE LJ. 2403 (1991).
143. See, e.g., Rothstein, supra note 89 (changing "things like 'shared mental models' and other such gener-
ally held basic beliefs which are rooted in a society's historically established culture" is difficult).
144. MWENDA, LEGAL ASPECTS, supra note 93, at 31-32.
145. Id. at 33.
146. Id. at 32-33 (referencing Marc Quintyn & Michael W. Taylor, Sbould Financial Sector Regulators Be
Independent?, 32 EcoN. ISSUEs 6 (2004)).
147. Rothstein, supra note 89, at I (in context of the most recent financial crisis, but relevant nevertheless).
148. This argument assumes that local investors will prefer to invest in foreign stock and bonds over those of
local firms.
149. Such requirements are common in developed markets. Nevertheless, foreign issuers may balk at per-
mitting foreign workers, with their own unique social concerns, a voice in corporate internal matters.
150. See Messick, supra note 117, at 128-32.
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pliance with the terms of a written contract [is] difficult, if not impossible, in developing
countries" whose "economies are simply subject to too many exogenous shocks for con-
tracts to be strictly enforced . . . ."151 Moreover, the stringent application of liquidation
priorities' 52 after an economic shock may produce inequitable, and ultimately destabi-
lizing, results. As another illustration: a local cultural norm commanding the boycott of
wrongdoers may serve as a sufficient deterrent for dishonest and manipulative behavior,
although foreigners will be unfamiliar with it and therefore hesitant to embrace it in rela-
tion to misbehaving corporate management. 53
3. Special Governance Rules for Institutional Investors
SSA governments and others working on legislation must concern themselves not only
with the peculiarities of the local culture, but also the specific concerns raised by the
involvement of foreign public pension fund investors. In the United States, for example,
critics of the increased activism of pension funds and other institutional investors worry
that their activities will become too politicized, that is, that they might exert their influ-
ence to support a specific political agenda rather than maximize long-term, sustainable
growth. Here, requiring that funds hire independent, professional managers and appoint
member-elected trustees will help ensure that the political managers do not use the funds'
resources to pursue private objectives.154 Moreover, staggering board positions and en-
suring term limits for service will enhance the likelihood that the funds will remain inde-
pendent from special interests. 55
D. TRANSPARENCY AND REPORTING
Good corporate governance is not all that is needed to entice foreign public pension
funds to SSA markets. "[Rieliable, timely and readily accessible information is fundamen-
tal for investors" 5 6 or at least for those investors currently participating in more devel-
oped securities markets. Transparency is also absolutely necessary for financial market
stability.' 57 As the fundamental philosophy underpinning the regulatory regimes in the
United States and other relatively more developed economies is one of disclosure and
transparency, established public pension fund investors will expect the same from markets
where they choose to invest. Likewise, the prevention and suppression of fraud is an
151. Id. at 129 (citing Marcel Fafchamps, The Enforcement of Commercial Contracts in Ghana, 24 WORLD DEV.
427 (1996)).
152. Where a company's secured creditors are paid before unsecured creditors and equity holders are paid
last. One can imagine a scenario where a drought leads to a bankruptcy, which then leads to a liquidation that
favors payment to foreign lenders over the salaries of local workers.
153. Messick, supra note 117, at 131 (observing that local custom of boycotting contract breakers may offend
some western norms, yet should be embraced during legal reform).
154. Hess, supra note 56, at 261-62.
155. Id. at 261.
156. Int'l Org. of Sec. Commissions [IOSCO), Tech. Committee, Principles for Ongoing Disclosure and Mate-
rial Development Reporting by Listed Entities 2, (Oct. 2002) [hereinafter 1OSCO Ongoing Disclourel.
157. E.g., Follow-up International Conference on Financing for Development to Review the Implementa-
tion of the Monterrey Consensus, Doha, Qatar, Nov. 29-Dec. 2, 2008, Doba Declaration on Financing for
Development, 1 72, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.212/L. I /Rev. 1, available at http//www.un.org/esa/ffd/doha/docu-
ments/DohaDeclarationFFD.pdf.
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important and related priority. 58 Therefore, emerging securities markets endeavoring to
attract investors are advised to adopt and implement rules addressing these concerns.
Moreover, to attract long-term public pension fund investors specifically interested in
sustainable development, SSA governments should also adopt some modified transparency
and disclosure regulations. In particular, disclosure rules involving an issuer's perform-
ance with regards to sustainability as well as environmental and social issues will attract
the most development-conscious, long-term oriented investors. 59 These rules, as well as
those accepted by the consensus as relevant and important to all investors, are described
briefly below.
1. The Ingredients of Full Disclosure of Material Information
Developed markets agree that adequate disclosure includes a presentation of the issuer's
finances and the context and assumptions under which such presentation is made. The
presentation also includes a revelation of management's expectations and observations
about earnings, cash flows,' 6o and the risks they face.' 61 Additionally, full disclosure of all
material information requires an identification of any major stockholders and voting rights
conferred, a description of remuneration policies for management, and a discussion of
related party transactions and foreseeable risk factors.16 2 Disclosure obligations, moreo-
ver, should be ongoing and cyclical.163
In addition, independent and objective external auditors, held accountable to sharehold-
ers, should review the reliability and accuracy of financial disclosures.164 Indeed, the re-
moval of any existing "cozy boardroom atmosphere" between corporate management and
their accountants will help prevent the kinds of financial collapses seen in the United
States in 2002 (Enron and WorldCom) and the United Kingdom in 1991(Robert Maxwell
and Polly Peck). 65
2. Special Reporting Rules to Attract Responsible Public Pension Fund Investors
In addition to adopting the mandatory minimum with regards to disclosure and trans-
parency regulations, SSA governments can enact laws that specifically encourage the par-
ticipation of public pension fund investors desirous of aiding the development of stable
securities markets. In the United States, for example, securities laws do not require public
158. E.g., Karmel, supra note 49, at 971.
159. Hess, supra note 56, at 232.
160. Modern corporate finance theory holds that the price of securities, a reflection of investor opinion, is
based upon cash flows, for example, the present value of future expected cash flows. In fact, securities are
often valued by a company's discounted future cash flows (the "DCF" methodology). Developed market
regulators therefore support disclosure obligations compatible with this theory.
161. Int'l Org. of Sec. Commissions [IOSCO], Tech. Committee, General Principles Regarding Disclosure of
Management's Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations (Feb. 2003), available at
http-J/www.sec.gov/about/offices/oia/oia-corpfin/genprinc.pdf.
162. OECD Principles, supra note 91, at 30-3 1.
163. See IOSCO Ongoing Disclosure, supra note 156. Because "most retail investors participate in the securi-
ties markets through the secondary trading that occurs in the markets, rather than through initial offerings."
Id. Establishing liquidity requires the development of a strong secondary market. According to the IOSCO,
a strong secondary market, in turn, requires accurate ongoing disclosure. See id.
164. OECD Principles, supra note 91, at 22.
165. See Williams & Conley, supra note 49, at 511.
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companies to report on sustainability and long-term development issues. Moreover, the
information, when voluntarily reported, "is not standardized and often qualitative."166 If
SSA governments required this kind of disclosure of their listed companies, they will
"[empower] the corporation's stakeholders (e.g., community members, consumers, and in-
vestors) to pressure and work with corporations" to ensure the stable growth of mar-
kets.167 Public pension fund investors, moreover, could then more easily discover and
invest in socially responsible companies.
E. OTHER LEGAL REFORMS To ArrRACT PENSION FUND INVESTORS
While the implementation and enforcement of strong and consistent corporate govern-
ance and transparency reforms will do much to attract investors, SSA countries can take
certain extra measures to attract public pension funds in particular. A few suggestions are
presented below.
1. Socially Responsible Investing Protected from Breaches of Fiduciary Duties
From time to time, public institutional investors express their concern that making in-
vestment decisions based upon social considerations violates their fiduciary duties to plan
members. Their fundamental task, after all, is to accumulate as much money as possible
for public employees' retirement funds. Therefore, to encourage long-term and socially
conscious investments, SSA countries might negotiate with foreign lawmakers to ensure
that pension fund trustees are shielded from liability for breaches of fiduciary duty arising
from their interest in such investments. 16 8
2. Laws Favoring Long-Term Investors
SSA regulators can also promulgate laws specifically favoring long-term public pension
funds over other kinds of investors. For example, allowing these investors to commit to
certain types of shareholder activism, 169 so long as such conduct contributes to an issuer's
long-term health, may be advisable.o7 0 Given the rancor with which corporate boards in
the United States view such "meddlesome" behavior, SSA countries should ensure that
similar problems do not arise within their own borders. Other recommendations include
regulation of shareholder remuneration (dividend) programs so as to align them with
long-term interests, enhanced transparency rules for hedge fund investors, and executive
pay regulation aimed at discouraging dangerous risk-taking.171 SSA authorities might also
confine shareholder voting rights to long-term investors like public pension funds. For
example, recent and pending reforms in the United States would condition shareholders'
166. Hess, supra note 56, at 233.
167. Id. at 234.
168. See id. at 247; Cross, supra note 51, at 968-69.
169. "Shareholder activism" is the label assigned to shareholder involvement in corporate decision-making
through, for example, involvement in proxy contests, director elections, etc.
170. E.g., TUAC to the OECD, Consultation with the OECD Steering Group on Corporate Governance,
Written Contribution by the TUAC 8-9, DAF/CA/CG(2009)1 (Apr. 20, 2009). But critics argue that some
forms of shareholder activism put undue pressure on boards to come up with short-term profits, regardless of
their long-term impact.
171. Id. at 2-6.
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influence on the makeup of corporate management on the size and duration of their
holdings.172
VI. Conclusion
SSA's nascent securities markets lack sufficient liquidity and capitalization to truly en-
able stable and meaningful economic development. This paper suggests that the leverag-
ing of foreign public pension funds can help to grow SSA's markets by increasing
participation, developing greater liquidity and capitalization, and enhancing regulatory
institutions. They will also ensure that SSA's markets develop equitably, responsibly, and
sustainably. Indeed, pension funds, as the investment vehicles of normal, everyday work-
ing people, are uniquely positioned to advance sustainable and socially-conscious develop-
ment. And, although foreign public pension fund investment in SSA remains relatively
insignificant, there is hope for the future. Those interested in African development can
pursue certain legal reforms to attract these well-meaning and powerful investors.
172. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 112 (2010) (allowing shareholders to pass corporate by-laws to make
such rules); 17 C.F.R. §§ 200, 232, 240; 74 Fed. Reg., 67144-45 (Dec. 18, 2009) (proposed proxy access rule
allowing larger shareholders to nominate and include their preferred candidates on corporate proxy
materials).
SUMMER 2010

